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Language use reveals information about who we are and how we feel1-3. One of the pioneers 
in text analysis, Walter Weintraub, manually counted which types of words people used in 
medical interviews and showed that the frequency of first-person singular pronouns (i.e., I, 
me, my) was a reliable indicator of depression, with depressed people using I more often 
than people who are not depressed4. Several studies have demonstrated that language use 
also differs between truthful and deceptive statements5-7, but not all differences are 
consistent across people and contexts, making prediction difficult8. Here we show how well 
linguistic deception detection performs at the individual level by developing a model 
tailored to a single individual: the current US president. Using tweets fact-checked by an 
independent third party (Washington Post), we found substantial linguistic differences 
between factually correct and incorrect tweets and developed a quantitative model based 
on these differences. Next, we predicted whether out-of-sample tweets were either factually 
correct or incorrect and achieved a 73% overall accuracy. Our results demonstrate the 
power of linguistic analysis in real-world deception research when applied at the individual 
level and provide evidence that factually incorrect tweets are not random mistakes of the 
sender. 
 
Since the early work by Weintraub4, methods have been developed to automatically count the 
different types of words people use9,10, making text analysis an efficient and objective research 
method to study stable traits such as personality1-4 and more temporary states such as 
cooperation11. Thanks to substantial improvements in automated speech recognition, the usability 
and applicability of such analyses will only further increase12. Applied to deception detection, 
linguistic analysis showed that liars use more tentative, angry, emotional, and cognitive-
processing words than truth tellers13. However, the observed patterns have been partly 
contradictory and have limited discriminative power8. One possible explanation is that the 
differences between truthful and deceptive language are too small to be consistently observed. 
Alternatively, there might be significant variation between individuals in language use, which 
limits the performance of one-size-fits-all models14. The question remains how well the 
techniques for a whole population can be tailored to a single person. Answering this question 
requires a large set of statements by a single individual of which the ground truth is known15. To 
date, this has proven challenging because the large scale fact-checking needed to acquire such a 
dataset requires substantial time and effort. 
In the present paper, we put language-based lie detection to the test in a unique real-world 
setting, by analysing a multitude of statements made by a single individual, the current US 
president. Several organisations have tasked themselves with fact-checking statements of US 
presidents16. The communication channels that are checked include official speeches, Facebook 
posts, and tweets. Although some are posted under the president’s name (e.g., Facebook posts), 
or are delivered by the president (e.g., speeches), the message itself may have been crafted by 
others, potentially introducing noise to the signal. Of all fact-checked communication channels, 
the current US president seems to be most in control of his Twitter account17. In addition, tweets 
are considered official White House communication18. This official status combined with 
systematic fact-checking provides the opportunity for deception detection for a single individual, 
in a high-stakes official context. 
Previous analyses by independent fact-checkers concluded that presidential candidates and US 
presidents regularly say or write things that are factually incorrect19,20. In the media, these 
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incorrect statements are often portrayed as deceptive21. However, an incorrect statement does not 
necessarily imply a lie. The sender may simply be wrong and have a false belief22. Being wrong 
should not affect language use because there is no difference in the perception or intention of the 
sender. In contrast, when deliberately presenting false statements as truths, one would expect a 
change in language use, according to the deception hypothesis5-7,13 . Lying can cause behavioral 
change because it is cognitively demanding, elicits emotions, and increases attempted behavioral 
control8,23. We tested the deception hypothesis by investigating whether differences in language 
can be used to distinguish between correct and incorrect statements. 
We collected a dataset (Dataset 1) of 605 presidential tweets by @realDonaldTrump over 
February – April 2018. The Washington Post provided us with a dataset comprising fact-checked 
communications from this period that we matched to our Twitter data file. As a result, we could 
identify which tweets were deemed incorrect, and labelled the remainder as correct. We named 
the obtained variable veracity. We screened the dataset to remove tweets contaminated by others 
(e.g., retweets, see details in the Methods section), resulting in a dataset containing 447 tweets 
(29.53% incorrect). Subsequently, we used the program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC2015) to identify how often different word categories were used in each tweet. LIWC 
calculates a score for 93 different categories, ranging from linguistic dimensions such as personal 
pronouns and negations, to psychological processes such as positive and negative emotions and 
cognitive processing9. During the screening process, we removed web links from the tweets, 
thereby altering punctuation in tweets. As a result, we excluded the LIWC punctuation categories 
except exclamation marks, leaving 82 categories. In addition, two dummy variables were created 
to identify whether a tweet included @ and # characters, since these are specifically relevant to 
tweets. 
The deception hypothesis predicts that the type of words differs between truthful and deceptive 
statements. We ran a MANOVA comparing the means of the 82 LIWC categories and two 
dummy variables between correct and incorrect tweets. Using Pillai’s trace, it revealed a main 
effect of veracity V = .35, F (84, 362) = 2.37, p < 0.001 (two-sided, as all the tests reported in 
this paper), η2p = .36 and demonstrated that 28 (33.33%) word categories significantly differed (α 
= 1%) between the correct and incorrect statements. Results are reported in detail in the 
Supplementary Information file and Figure 1 gives an overview of variables. Overall, correct 
statements contained more positive feelings (i.e., emotional tone and positive emotions) whereas 
incorrect statements were more evasive, with an increase in negations, tentative words, and 
comparisons. The sender used fewer # and @ in incorrect tweets, which reduces active 
engagement with the audience. 
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Figure 1. Differences in variables between correct and incorrect tweets as a “Variable 
cloud”. The size of a variable is a function of the F statistics obtained in a MANOVA. Red/dark-
colored variables had higher means for incorrect tweets, green/light-colored variables for correct 
tweets. 
 
Next, we sought to find out how accurately we could identify the veracity of individual tweets 
based on these language cues. We estimated a logit model, starting with the 28 significant 
variables from the MANOVA. We removed variables stepwise to obtain the best value for the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), i.e. until removing an additional parameter would decrease 
the log-likelihood of the model by more than one. We tried alternative approaches (see Methods 
section) but the approach reported here gave the best compromise between parsimony and 
goodness of fit. The final model comprises 10 variables. Table 1 displays the results in terms of 
marginal effects at the mean. For instance, an additional percentage point (pp) of money words 
increases the chance of an incorrect statement by 1.4pp whereas a 1pp increase in religious 
words decreases the chance of an incorrect statement by 6.5pp.  
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 Marginal 
effects 
Standard 
errors 
z score p-value 
Word quantity .005 .001 3.948 0.000 
Emotional tone -.002 .001 -3.909 0.000 
Third-person plural pronouns .014 .010 1.460 0.144 
Adverbs .009 .005 1.879 0.060 
Negation .023 .009 2.484 0.013 
Comparison words .018 .006 2.777 0.005 
Tentative .012 .009 1.425 0.154 
Money .014 .006 2.386 0.017 
Religion -.065 .033 -1.961 0.050 
@ -.168 .047 -3.547 0.000 
Table 1. Marginal effects of types of words and symbols on the probability of a tweet being 
incorrect. Variables are expressed as percentage of total words, except word quantity and @ 
which are expressed as numbers of words / symbols. Logit regression, log-likelihood = -203.6, 
N=447.  
 
The model summarized in Table 1 can predict the probabilities of each tweet being incorrect. We 
classified tweets as predicted incorrect if the model assigned a higher chance than we would a 
priori expect, i.e., higher than 29.53%, and as predicted correct otherwise. A hit occurs when an 
[in]correct statement is classified as predicted [in]correct. On Dataset 1, we obtained a hit rate of 
76.51% for incorrect statements and 72.06% for correct statements, with an overall accuracy of 
73.38%. Figure 2 displays the ROC curve: the hit rate for incorrect statements as a function of hit 
rates for correct statements for all possible cut-offs. The diagonal represents random guessing 
and the top-left corner perfect classification. For all cut-offs, our model clearly outperformed 
random guessing. 
So far, we have demonstrated that there are language differences between the US president’s 
factually correct and incorrect tweets. We then demonstrated that those language differences 
were strong enough to classify correct and incorrect tweets with an overall accuracy of 73.38%. 
Next, we investigate how consistent these differences in language use are by predicting the 
veracity of tweets in an out-of-sample test. We gathered a second dataset (Dataset 2) of 606 
presidential tweets covering the three-month period November 2017 – January 2018 and applied 
the same screening methods, resulting in a dataset containing 464 tweets (22.84% incorrect). We 
then applied the model trained on Dataset 1 to identify how well we could classify tweets in 
Dataset 2. Using the same prior as for Dataset 1, we obtained a hit rate of 67.92% for incorrect 
statements and 74.02% for correct statements, with an overall accuracy of 72.63%. For 
comparison, random guessing using the prior probability of 29.53% for any tweet to be incorrect, 
would obtain an overall accuracy of 58.38% on Dataset 1 and of 61.11% on Dataset 2. The ROC 
curve for Dataset 2 is depicted in grey in Figure 2. It is lower than the curve for Dataset 1 but 
still clearly dominates random guessing. Alternatively, a cut-off of 50% would give an accuracy 
of 50% for random guessing and a higher overall accuracy for our model (77.40% for Dataset 1, 
78.45% for Dataset 2). Hence, our approach using a prior probability as cut-off reduces the 
difference between random guessing and our model, representing a tougher test of our model. 
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Figure 2. Hit rates for factually correct statements as a function of hit rates for factually 
incorrect statement when cutoff varies. Predictions are obtained from the model in Table 1. 
The black curve is for Dataset 1 and the grey for Dataset 2. The black dot represents the prior 
used as a random guess and triangles when the prior is used as cutoff in our model. Coordinates 
of the points, i.e. hit rates, are between brackets. Corresponding accuracies are denoted acc.1 for 
Dataset 1 and acc.2 for Dataset 2. 
 
Previous research demonstrated that language changes when lying5-7,13. The majority of this 
research was conducted using single statements by large groups of people. Here, we investigated 
whether we could distinguish between correct and incorrect statements made by a single 
individual. Fact-checked tweets by the current US president uniquely allowed for such a 
comparison. The MANOVA results from this study showed large differences in language use 
between correct and incorrect tweets, supporting the deception hypothesis. 
Some of these language differences are in line with previous findings in the deception literature. 
For example, liars experience more negative emotions (i.e., increased use of negative emotion 
and anger words, and negations), and they tend to distance themselves more (i.e., increased use 
of third person pronouns; 10). The current US president further increased social distance by 
decreasing the use of @ and # symbols in incorrect tweets. However, his incorrect tweets were 
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longer and more tentative than correct ones, whilst in general, lies tend to be shorter and contain 
fewer differentiating and tentative words than truths13. We cannot reject the explanation that 
longer tweets are simply more likely to contain erroneous statements than shorter tweets.  
Compared to previous language-based deception studies, the 73%-74% overall accuracy of our 
model is promising. For example, Bond and colleagues14 found classification rates of 63-67% 
based on the truthful and deceptive communications of several US presidential candidates. Our 
high out-of-sample accuracy shows that the language differences between true and false 
statements are relatively stable. Improving random guessing with 12-15pp when relying on 
priors, and 27-28pp when assuming an equal split between truths and lies, this model could help 
as a screening tool for anyone with an interest in fact-checking. Accuracy rates could potentially 
be further increased when combining multiple detection methods, such as keystroke analysis24. 
A limitation of the current study is that we used the fact-checking output of an independent third 
party as a proxy for the ground truth, potentially introducing noise in our data. For instance, the 
Washington Post only labelled statements as incorrect when they contained incorrect verifiable 
facts. Opinions and statements about the future are not labelled as factually incorrect, resulting in 
a conservative estimation of all incorrect tweets. While the ground truth cannot be guaranteed, 
focusing on statements that are factually verifiable made the classification less sensitive to the 
political opinion of the fact-checkers.  
In this paper we demonstrated that the language people use can unintentionally reveal many 
things about them. Linguistic analysis can serve to test whether incorrect statements are 
predictable, and therefore likely to be deceptive. On the one side, such models can be a screening 
tool to help journalists in their work as the fourth pillar of democracy. They could also be used to 
identify potentially incorrect information on social media. On the other side, any person having 
access to people’s personal posts and a way to approximate ground truth, could develop a model 
such as the one in this paper. Therefore, these results also constitute a warning to all posting a 
wealth of private information online. 
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Methods 
Datasets  
We collected a dataset (Dataset 1) of presidential tweets by @realDonaldTrump from 
http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com, covering a recent three-month period (February – April 
2018). In total, 605 tweets were gathered. The Washington Post provided us with a dataset 
comprising fact-checked communications from this time period that we matched to our Twitter 
data file. As a result, we could identify which tweets were deemed factually incorrect, and 
labelled the remainder as correct. Subsequently, this dataset was screened to reduce noise. We 
removed retweets (66) and tweets containing quotes of over 6 words (52) to eliminate 
contamination of our data with tweets from others. We also removed duplicate tweets (16) and 
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tweets solely containing web links (2). In addition, we merged tweets that together conveyed one 
message (22), leaving a final dataset of 447 tweets. Of these 447 tweets, 132 tweets (29.53%) 
were classified as factually incorrect and 315 as factually correct (70.47%).  
Subsequently, we used the software program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC 
2015) to identify how often different word categories were used in each tweet. LIWC calculates 
a score for 93 different categories, ranging from linguistic dimensions such as personal pronouns 
and negations, to psychological processes such as positive and negative emotions and cognitive 
processing2. During the screening process, we removed web links from the tweets, thereby 
altering punctuation. As a result, we excluded the LIWC punctuation categories except 
exclamation marks, leaving 82 categories. In addition, two dummy variables were created to 
identify whether a tweet included an @ and/or a #, since these symbols are specifically relevant 
to tweets. 
We gathered a second dataset (Dataset 2) of presidential tweets covering the three-month 
period (November 2017 – January 2018) preceding the period covered in Dataset 1. In total, 606 
tweets were gathered. We applied identical screening methods, removing retweets (85), 
duplications (6), tweets containing severe spelling mistakes (2), and tweets containing quotes 
with more than 6 words (29). In addition, 20 tweets were merged, leaving a final dataset of 464 
tweets. Of these 464 tweets, 106 (22.84%) were classified as factually incorrect, leaving 358 
factually correct tweets (77.16%).  
 
MANOVA 
We first ran a MANOVA to compare the means of the 82 LIWC variables and the two 
dummy variables (presence of @ or #) between the factually correct and the factually incorrect 
tweets. The Supplementary Information file “SI File MANOVA.csv” reports the results of the 
MANOVA on Dataset 1. It provides the means for factually correct and incorrect statements in 
Dataset 1, the F-statistics, p-values, and significance levels (*: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 
0.001). In total, 38 variables were significant at a 5% level, among which 28 were significant at a 
1% level, and among which 15 were significant at a 0.01% level. 
 
Model selection 
The second step of our analysis involved developing a model to predict factually 
incorrect statements. We used logit regressions with veracity as dependent variables and we had 
to determine which subset of the 84 variables to use. Too many variables may lead to overfitting 
and poor prediction power. To select the model (i.e., the set of explanatory variables), we use 
two criteria: 
 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which penalizes the log-likelihood 
(measuring the goodness of fit) by the number of variables to favor parsimonious 
models; 
 The Area Under the Curve (AUC) of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curves. The logit model provides probabilistic predictions for each tweet. We can use 
these probabilities to classify tweets as “predicted correct” vs. “predicted incorrect”. 
For instance, with a cut-off of 50%, we require that a tweet has a predicted 
probability of more than 50% to be classified as “predicted incorrect”. A “hit” occurs 
when an [in]correct statement is classified as predicted [in]correct. ROC curves 
display hit rates for incorrect statements as a function of hit rates for correct 
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statements when the cut-off varies. In other words, calling factually incorrect 
statements “positives”, ROC curves display the rate of true positives (also known as 
sensitivity or recall) as a function of 1 minus the rate of false positives (also known as 
specificity, the hit rates for negatives). By tradition, the x-axis is going from 1 to 0 if 
it displays specificity, and from 0 to 1 if it displays the rate of false positives. The 
diagonal represents random guessing for all possible cut-off values. The position of 
the curve above the diagonal shows the improvement over random guessing, with the 
upper left corner being perfect classification. The AUC measures the area under the 
curve. By construction, random guessing has an AUC of 0.5 and a perfect classifier of 
1. 
Several approaches were possible to select variables. When evaluating these approaches, 
we only considered the 28 variables that were significant at a 1% level according to the 
MANOVA because regressions of 447 observations on 84 variables led to perfect separation 
issues with extreme but non-significant coefficients. 
 
First, we used stepwise selection of variables, either forward or backward, using AIC as a 
criterion to stop the process.  
 Model “Forward”: The forward-stepwise selection means introducing variables one by 
one until the AIC does not decrease anymore. We implemented this approach starting 
with the variable with the highest F statistics in the MANOVA: Word quantity.  
 Model “Backward”: The backward-stepwise approach starts with the whole set of 28 
variables and removes them one by one, until the AIC does not decrease anymore. 
Second, we also followed the approaches of5-7, 14 and used the variables that were 
significant in the MANOVA. This gave us two possible models: 
 Model “28 variables”, including the variables that were significant at 1% in the 
MANOVA. 
 Model “15 variables” including the variables that were significant at 0.1% in the 
MANOVA. 
Third, Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) is used in machine 
learning to select variables. It directly penalizes the presence of variables in the regression. We 
applied this approach as well: 
 Model “Lasso”: variables selected by LASSO with the penalty level (known as lambda) 
that gives the lowest cross-validation mean standard errors. 
We evaluated the models on Dataset 1 and obtained the following results: 
 Model “Forward” (10 variables):  Log-likelihood = -203.60; AIC = 429.20; AUC = 0.823. 
 Model “Backward” (10 variables): Log-likelihood = -203.60; AIC = 429.20; AUC = 0.823. 
 Model “28 variables”: Log-likelihood = -197.89; AIC = 453.78; AUC = 0.834. 
 Model “15 variables”: Log-likelihood = -206.96; AIC = 445.92; AUC = 0.819. 
 Model “Lasso” (25 variables): Log-likelihood = -194.74; AIC = 441.48; AUC = 0.841. 
The “Forward” and “Backward” selection procedures gave the same model, with 10 
variables. As could be expected, the model with all 28 variables has the highest log-likelihood. In 
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terms of AIC, models “Forward” and “Backwards” score much better (i.e., get much lower AIC) 
than the other models, which is not surprising because they were developed using AIC as 
selection criterion. More interestingly, in terms of AUC, all models perform very closely from 
each other, with values 0.82-0.83meaning that they are all closer to perfect classification than to 
random guessing. To conclude, the “Backward” (or equivalently “Forward”) model manages to 
obtain comparable results than the other models in terms of AUC but with much more 
parsimony, using only 10 variables. This is the model reported in the paper and the remainder of 
the Supplementary Information file. 
 
Out-of-Sample Predictions 
Using the selected “Backwards” model, we could compute predicted probabilities on out-
of-sample tweets. We used the coefficients obtained on the training set (Dataset 1) and applied 
them to the variables of the test set (Dataset 2) to predict the probability of each tweet to be 
factually incorrect. Using these predicted probabilities, we could again draw a ROC curve. 
Figure 2 in the paper displays the ROC curve obtained for the test set next to the ROC curve 
obtained for the training set. 
 
The AUC for the test set is 0.782, to be compared with the AUC of 0.823 obtained for the 
training set. As could be expected, it decreases but is still very close to 0.8. To make the results 
more concrete, one may want to choose a specific cut-off, i.e. to decide which point of the curve 
to consider. Several approaches are possible. 
 The first one is simply to use 0.5 but it has the drawback that it relies heavily on the exact 
quantitative prediction of our model, and for instance, on the logit assumption. It gives an 
accuracy of 77.40% [78.45%] for the training [test] set, and hit rates of 50.76% [38.68%] 
and 88.57% [90.22%] for factually incorrect and correct tweets, respectively. This 
threshold is very conservative, missing many incorrect statements. 
 An alternative is to rely on the direction of predictions with respect to our prior. In other 
words, is a tweet more likely to be factually incorrect than we would have expected ex 
ante? To do so, used the base rate of factually incorrect statements in the training set 
(29.53%) and then used this cut-off to classify as “predicted incorrect” statements for 
which the model gave a higher probability than the base rate. We used this cut-off in the 
paper for its intuitive (Bayesian) appeal and its ease of interpretation. 
 Other approaches would involve an external criterion (e.g., accuracy, average hit rates, 
average F1 score) and finding the cut-off that maximizes this criterion. There is no strict 
dominance of any criterion over all other possible criteria and such a choice would 
depend on practical or contextual arguments. 
Code availability 
Upon publication, the complete datafile including screened tweets, veracity verdicts, and 
associated LIWC scores, and the R code to replicate all statistical analyses and ROC curves will 
be made available without restrictions on Github. 
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Supplementary Information 
Variable name LIWC name 
Mean  
if correct 
Mean 
 if incorrect 
F stat. p-value Sig. 
Word quantity Word_count 31.61 44.35 45.81 0.0000 * * * 
Analytic thinking Analytic 74.67 68.65 4.88 0.0277 * 
Clout Clout 71.03 61.09 16.42 0.0001 * * * 
Authentic Authentic 32.91 29.71 0.94 0.3317  
Emotional tone Tone 68.64 44.46 36.38 0.0000 * * * 
Average sentence length WPS 12.85 13.95 2.37 0.1243  
Six-letter words Sixltr 22.79 20.45 4.97 0.0263 * 
Dictionary words Dic 79.24 81.05 2.42 0.1203  
Total function words function. 43.34 47.34 12.21 0.0005 * * * 
Total pronouns pronoun 8.98 8.72 0.15 0.6986  
Personal pronouns ppron 6.14 5.52 1.22 0.2694  
First-person singular pronouns i 1.24 1.04 0.75 0.3877  
First-person plural pronouns we 2.37 1.68 3.10 0.0788  
Total second-person pronouns you 1.11 0.64 2.16 0.1423  
Third-person singular pronouns shehe 0.69 0.68 0.00 0.9944  
Third-person plural pronouns they 0.73 1.47 14.32 0.0002 * * * 
Impersonal pronouns ipron 2.84 3.21 1.32 0.2504  
Articles article 6.42 6.67 0.32 0.5698  
Prepositions prep 12.7 12.74 0.00 0.9442  
Auxiliary verbs auxverb 7.58 9.09 7.34 0.0070 * * 
Adverbs adverb 3.66 5.49 18.86 0.0000 * * * 
Conjunctions conj 4.71 5.02 0.61 0.4368  
Negations negate 1.04 2.48 45.55 0.0000 * * * 
Common verbs verb 13.46 15.5 7.38 0.0068 * * 
Adjectives adj 6.47 6.19 0.18 0.6718  
Comparison words compare 1.37 2.49 14.98 0.0001 * * * 
Interrogatives interrog 0.91 1.32 3.98 0.0467 * 
Numbers number 1.62 2.13 1.86 0.1739  
Table S.1. Statistics for the 28 LIWC categories, with means for factual correct and incorrect 
statements in Dataset 1. F-statistics and significance values are reported. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 
0.01; ***: p < 0.001.  
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Variable name LIWC name 
Mean  
if correct 
Mean 
 if incorrect 
F stat. p-value Sig. 
Quantifiers quant 1.92 2.34 1.71 0.1911  
Emotions affect 9.83 7.8 6.97 0.0086 * * 
Positive emotions posemo 7.56 4.06 23.10 0.0000 * * * 
Negative emotions negemo 2.19 3.64 9.99 0.0017 * * 
Anxiety anx 0.13 0.24 2.59 0.1084  
Anger anger 0.35 0.79 11.91 0.0006 * * * 
Sadness sad 0.5 0.84 3.21 0.0740  
Social processes social 9.52 8.15 3.82 0.0514  
Family family 0.24 0.05 5.28 0.0220 * 
Friends friend 0.2 0.16 0.20 0.6513  
Female references female 0.48 0.47 0.00 0.9693  
Male references male 0.84 0.74 0.19 0.6633  
Cognitive processes cogproc 6.96 10.53 36.05 0.0000 * * * 
Insight insight 0.99 1.05 0.10 0.7478  
Causations cause 1.05 1.82 12.55 0.0004 * * * 
Discrepancy discrep 1.11 1.71 6.94 0.0087 * * 
Tentative tentat 1.16 2.09 16.87 0.0000 * * * 
Certainty certain 1.83 2.57 5.65 0.0179 * 
Differentiation differ 1.55 2.62 17.62 0.0000 * * * 
Perceptual processes percept 1.62 1.29 1.31 0.2525  
Seeing see 0.88 0.72 0.43 0.5131  
Hearing hear 0.33 0.4 0.39 0.5301  
Feeling feel 0.4 0.17 2.91 0.0890  
Biology bio 0.84 0.51 3.04 0.0819  
Body body 0.13 0.06 0.79 0.3740  
Health health 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.9610  
Sexual sexual 0.03 0 1.12 0.2901  
Ingestion ingest 0.15 0.06 1.14 0.2861  
Table S.2. Statistics for the 28 LIWC categories, with means for factual correct and incorrect 
statements in Dataset 1. F-statistics and significance values are reported. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 
0.01; ***: p < 0.001. 
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Variable name LIWC name 
Mean  
if correct 
Mean 
 if incorrect 
F stat. p-value Sig. 
Drives drives 13.24 10.89 8.00 0.0049 * * 
Affiliation affiliation 3.78 2.31 9.45 0.0022 * * 
Achievement achieve 2.25 1.58 4.76 0.0296 * 
Power power 5.02 5.19 0.12 0.7263  
Reward focus reward 2.96 1.77 7.89 0.0052 * * 
Risk focus risk 0.82 1.35 5.73 0.0171 * 
Past orientation focuspast 2.52 3.58 8.59 0.0036 * * 
Present orientation focuspresent 8.65 10.03 4.45 0.0355 * 
Future orientation focusfuture 1.79 1.22 4.72 0.0303 * 
Relativity relativ 14.47 13.95 0.34 0.5588  
Motion motion 1.61 1.57 0.03 0.8648  
Space space 8.27 8.06 0.10 0.7542  
Time time 5.09 4.51 1.20 0.2739  
Job/Work work 5.08 5.15 0.01 0.9178  
Leisure leisure 0.64 0.31 2.97 0.0854  
Home home 0.46 0.23 4.04 0.0450 * 
Money money 1.25 2.26 9.42 0.0023 * * 
Religion relig 0.69 0.05 9.00 0.0029 * * 
Death death 0.39 0.16 2.31 0.1290  
Informal informal 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.6843  
Swear words swear 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.9207  
Netspeak netspeak 0.07 0.11 0.63 0.4273  
Assent assent 0.1 0.03 0.49 0.4862  
Nonfluencies nonflu 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.8721  
Fillers filler 0.01 0 0.42 0.5180  
Exclamation marks Exclam 5.24 2.98 7.08 0.0081 * * 
#   0.12 0.03 8.61 0.0035 * * 
@   0.22 0.04 22.56 0.0000 * * * 
Table S.3. Statistics for the 26 LIWC categories and two symbols (@ and #), with means for 
factual correct and incorrect statements in Dataset 1. F-statistics and significance values are 
reported. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001. 
 
